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Abstract
We provide a general description of the phenomenon of entanglement in bipartite systems, as it manifests
in micro and macro physical systems, as well as in human cognitive processes. We do so by observing that
when genuine coincidence measurements are considered, the violation of the ‘marginal laws’, in addition
to the Bell-CHSH inequality, is also to be expected. The situation can be described in the quantum
formalism by considering the presence of entanglement not only at the level of the states, but also at the
level of the measurements. However, at the “local” level of a specific joint measurement, a description
where entanglement is only incorporated in the state remains always possible, by adopting a fine-tuned
tensor product representation. But contextual tensor product representations should only be considered
when there are good reasons to describe the outcome-states as (non-entangled) product states. This
will not in general be true, hence, the entangement resource will have to generally be allocated both in
the states and in the measurements. In view of the numerous violations of the marginal laws observed
in physics’ laboratories, it remains unclear to date if entanglement in micro-physical systems is to be
understood only as an ‘entanglement of the states’, or also as an ‘entanglement of the measurements’.
But even if measurements would also be entangled, the corresponding violation of the marginal laws (no-
signaling conditions) would not for this imply that a superluminal communication would be possible.
Keywords: Human cognition; quantum structures; quantum measurements; Bell inequalities; entangle-
ment; superposition; marginal laws; no-signaling conditions; marginal selectivity.
1 Introduction
The term ‘entanglement’ was firstly officially introduced by Schro¨dinger, in the thirties of the last century.
He described it as a situation of two systems whose states are initially known, which following a temporary
interaction enter into a state where one has a complete knowledge of the state of the bipartite system formed
by their combination, but not anymore (apparently at least) a complete knwowledge of their individual
states, and this even though they may become widely separated in space and therefore, one would expect, in
a condition such that they should possess well-defined individual properties. Schro¨dinger famoulsy asserted
that he did not consider entanglement as “one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics,
the one that enforces its entire departure from classical lines of thought” (Schro¨dinger, 1935).
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Thirty years later, John Bell derived the famous inequalities that today bear his name, which are able
to test the presence of entanglement in bipartite systems (Bell, 1964). When he did so, there was still an
ongoing and widespread debate in the physics’ community regarding the validity of quantum mechanics
as a fundamental theory of our physical reality. Bell himself did not believe that in actual experiments,
like those that would be realized by Aspect’s and other experimental groups in the following decades, his
inequalities would be violated (Aspect et al., 1982a; Aspect, 1983; Aspect et al., 1982b; Tittel et al., 1998;
Weihs et al., 1998; Giustina et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2013; Hensen et al., 2016). But nowadays the
predictions of quantum theory are no longer put into question, not only as regards entanglement, which
has been shown to be preservable over distances of more than a thousand of kilometers (Yin et al., 2017),
but also with respect to many other effects predicted by the theory, like the delocalization of large organic
molecules (Gerlich et al., 2011), just to cite one. On the other hand, the debate about the profound meaning
of the theory never stopped, and in fact has constantly renewed and expanded over the years, so much so
that one can envisage this will produce in the end a Copernican-like revolution in the way we understand
the nature of our physical reality (Deutsch, 1998; Stapp, 2011; Kastner, 2013; Fuchs, 2017; Aerts et al.,
2018). Such debate, however, has not remained confined to physicists or philosophers of science, but also
reached new fields of investigation, in particular that of psychology, due to the development of that research
domain called ‘quantum cognition’, which saw its beginnings in the nineties of the last century (Aerts &
Aerts, 1995; Aerts et al., 1999; Khrennikov, 1999; Gabora & Aerts, 2002; Atmanspacher et al., 2002; Aerts
& Czachor, 2004; Aerts & Gabora, 2005a,b) and borrowed ideas from quantum physics to develop new
promising models for a variety of cognitive phenomena, also providing in return interesting insights as
regards our understanding of physical systems (Khrennikov, 2010; Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Haven &
Khrennikov, 2013; Wendt, 2015).
That said, it is worth observing that since the days of Schro¨dinger, one of the main elements of dissat-
isfaction was the presence of an irreducible (irremovable) probability in quantum theory. This famously
led Einstein to say, in a letter that he wrote to Max Born in 1926, that God “is not playing at dice”
(Born, 1971). Following the research that was carried out during the last four decades by our group, first
in Geneva and then in Brussels, we can say in retrospect that we do agree with him, as we are today
confident in asserting that quantum mechanics is not at odds with determinism, if the latter is understood
at the global level (Aerts, 1999; Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014, 2016). God does not play dice, indeed,
because s/he does not have to, as the irreducible quantum probabilities come from the fact that, as we
will explain in the article, as humans we are forced to play dice when we perform quantum measurements,
being the latter much like (weighted) symmetry breaking processes (the actual breaking the symmetry of
the potential), integrating in their very protocol the presence of fluctuations that cannot be eliminated
without at the same time altering the very nature of what is being measured (Sassoli de Bianchi, 2015).
The view that quantum entities might not always have well-defined values for certain observables, and
this not because we would be ignorant about these values, but because, literally, there would be no actual
values, was considered to be problematic by many, as against the view of realism, although this is truly
a matter of concern only for those adhering to the (we think false) prejudice that our physical reality
should be fully contained in space (or spacetime). However, considering all that we learned from quantum
physics and relativity, this is very likely to be a wrong (or incomplete) view, space being instead only a
very particular theater staging a small portion of our multidimensional reality, typically that populated by
the classic macroscopic entities (Aerts, 1999; Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014, 2017).
The presumed antirealism of quantum theory has brought people to investigate whether it would be
possible to substitute quantum theory by so called hidden-variable theories, aiming at explaining the
quantum probabilities as resulting from our lack of knowledge of an underlying (pre-empirical, pre-spatial,
non-spatial) deterministic reality. Bell’s work, in the sixties of last century (Bell, 1964, 1966, 1987), fits
into this context of searching for a hidden-variable theory (Genovese, 2005), and was deeply inspired by a
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situation that was described in 1935 by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR), still called today the ‘EPR
paradox’ (Einstein et al., 1935), although there are no more paradoxes, the situation having been clarified
not only from the experimental point of view (Aspect et al., 1982a; Aspect, 1983; Aspect et al., 1982b;
Tittel et al., 1998; Weihs et al., 1998; Giustina et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2013; Hensen et al., 2016),
but also from the logical one (Aerts, 1984; Sassoli de Bianchi, 2019a).
The situation put forward in the EPR article was later reformulated by David Bohm, using the clearer
example of two spins in an entangled spin state (Bohm, 1951), which is today considered to be the archetypi-
cal quantum entanglement situation, and we will also consider such example in our discussion in this article.
Regarding how the Bohm model situation is described by many working physicists, we observe that there
is still a disturbing “schizophrenia” about how the two entangled spin entities in a Bohm-EPR set up are
viewed. On the one hand, there is agreement in acknowledging that two spins, even though separated
in spatial terms, nevertheless form a single and whole system. On the other hand, there is difficulty in
accepting the consequence of such statement, implying that our spatial theater, as we said already, can
only be viewed as the tip of a much vaster non-spatial reality, which cannot be fully represented in space,
hence, cannot be understood only in terms of spatio-temporal phenomena akin to localized particles or
extended waves and fields.
In another letter to Max Born, Einstein wrote in 1947 (Born, 1971): “I admit, of course, that there is
a considerable amount of validity in the statistical approach which you were the first to recognise clearly
as necessary given the framework of the existing formalism. I cannot seriously believe in it because the
theory cannot be reconciled with the idea that physics should represent a reality in time and space, free
from spooky actions at a distance. [· · · ] I am quite convinced that someone will eventually come up with a
theory whose objects, connected by laws, are not probabilities but considered facts, as used to be taken for
granted until quite recently.” In a later commentary, Born wrote that the decisive sentence in Einstein’s
letter (Born, 1971): “[· · · ] is the one where he says: ‘that physics should represent a reality in time and
space, free from spooky actions at a distance’. I too had considered this postulate to be one which could
claim absolute validity. But the realities of physical experience had taught me that this postulate is not an
a priori principle but a time-dependent rule which must be, and can be, replaced by a more general one.”
This more general rule, mentioned by Born, asks us to abandon the ‘space contains reality hypoth-
esis’ and to accept what follows from the quantum formalism and its numerous successful tests in the
laboratories, i.e., that (Aerts, 1999): “reality is not contained within space. Space is a momentaneous
crystallization of a theatre for reality where the motions and interactions of the macroscopic material and
energetic entities take place. But other entities – like quantum entities for example – ‘take place’ outside
space, or – and this would be another way of saying the same thing – within a space that is not the
three-dimensional Euclidean space.”
Ironically enough, Einstein’s reality criterion (Einstein et al., 1935) provides one of the strong argu-
ments that intimate us to accept the non-spatiality of the quantum micro-entities. Indeed, Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle prevents us to simultaneously define both the position and momentum of a quan-
tum entity like an electron. Therefore, one cannot determine, not even in principle, how the position and
momentum of the entity will vary in time, and consequently one cannot predict with certainty, not even
in principle, its future locations. Following Einstein’s reality criterion, we have then to conclude that the
entity in question doesn’t possess the property of being somewhere in space, hence it would be a non-spatial
entity, which does not mean, however, that it would be an unreal entity (Sassoli de Bianchi, 2011).
Many additional arguments can be brought forward in support of the thesis that quantum entities should
be considered to be non-spatial, like those following from a study of their temporal behaviors, by means
of the notion of sojourn time (Sassoli de Bianchi, 2012), or from an analysis of spins greater than one-half,
which cannot be associated with any specific spatial direction (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2017), and of
course, there are also the many no-go theorems, in particular those of Kochen & Specker (1967), which if
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taken seriously tell us just that: that quantum entities cannot be depicted as the factual objects connected
by laws of Einstein’s desiderata, being instead more like entities having an unexpected “conceptual nature,”
being able to manifest in states having a varying degree of abstractness or concreteness, the more concrete
ones being those we usually describe as the classical spatio-temporal objects of our ordinary experience
(Aerts et al., 2018).
It is certainly not the purpose of the present paper to enter into a comprehensive discussion of the
non-spatial and conceptual behavior of quantum entities (see also, in that respect, the perspective offered
by Kastner’s possibilistic transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics (Kastner, 2013)). We only
want here to emphasize that it would be wrong to consider that a physical entity, to be real, has to exist in
space. If we let go such “classical prejudice,” then, when studying the phenomenon of entanglement, one
is not forced any more, as Einstein considered to be, to understand two entities that are separated in space
as two entities that would be necessarily disconnected to one another. If their state is non-spatial, then
the nature of their possible connection will simply be non-spatial as well, i.e., non-manifest as a connection
through space. If this is so, then there is no need to speak of “spooky actions at a distance,” as there
would be no phantom-like action of one entity over the other, during a Bell-test experiment. More simply,
Alice and Bob,1 with their instruments, localized in different regions of space, would both act on a same
entity, which forms a whole, and not on two independent entities.
In other words, it would be wrong to conceive a bipartite entity in an entangled state as two fully
separated entities, just because they can respond to different instruments placed at distant locations, and
that in between these locations the probability of a detection tends to zero, once the entangled entities
have been emitted by the source and have propagated away. If outcomes can be actualized in a coincident
and correlated way, in distant detectors, this is because the two apparent spatially divided fragments are
the tip of an undivided non-spatial entity, having some well-defined degree of availability in interacting
with different spatial measuring instruments, and by doing so acquiring spatial properties (for instance by
leaving a trace in a detection screen). If this is correct, then there is no reason to speak in terms of an
action, or influence, of Alice’s measurement on Bob’s measurement, and vice versa, as they would both
operate on a same undivided entity, at the same time. There is no influence of one measurement on the
other, only a single measurement jointly performed by Alice and Bob, on a whole entity. The latter can
then remain whole, or possibly disentangle, following their joint action, depending on the entity’s nature
and on the experimental operations. When joint measurements on entangled entities are understood in
this way, there is also no reasons to require that Alice’s statistics of outcomes would be independent of the
choice of actions operated by Bob, i.e., that the system would necessarily obey the so-called ‘no-signaling
conditions’ (also called ‘marginal laws’, or ‘marginal selectivity’).
These no-signaling conditions are implicitly assumed to be valid in the standard quantum formalism,
when joint measurements are represented by tensor product observables, defined with respect to a same
given tensor product decomposition of the Hilbert space. However, it remains today unclear if this is
the correct way to model certain experimental situations, considering that significant violations of the
no-signaling conditions have been evidenced in the physics’ laboratories (Adenier & Khrennikov, 2007; De
Raedt et al., 2012, 2013; Adenier & Khrennikov, 2017; Bednorz, 2017; Kupczynski, 2017). These violations
are totally unexpected if the adopted view is that in which Alice and Bob perform independent (although
coincident in time) measurements, instead of a bigger unique joint measurement. In other words, if we think
of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements as two distinct interrogative contexts, asking different and independent
questions, then there is indeed no reasons to expect that the statistics of answers collected by Alice could
be influenced by the questions that are asked by Bob.
1Alice and Bob are the two archetypical fictional characters used to described, in physics and cryptology, the joint ex-
perimental actions and data collections resulting from their sharing of a same bipartite system, typically in an entangled
state.
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The usual understanding of quantum entanglement in physics is indeed that of a situation where we have
a bipartite entity emitted by a source, like the two spin one-half fermions of Bohm’s archetypical model,
such that when they are flying apart, they are assumed to become fully independent. If this would be true,
it would be natural to think that the choice of measurement performed by Alice on its sub-system could
not be influenced by the choice of measurement performed by Bob, and vice versa. If the two fermionic
entities are fully separated (spatially and experimentally) this is indeed something to be expected, which
then translates in the constraints of the no-signaling conditions. The same reasoning would however lead
one to also expect that no correlations of the kind able to violate Bell’s inequality should be observed
between Alice’s and Bob’s answers, which is why Einstein described, and many physicists nowadays still
describe, the situation as a “spooky action at a distance.” The action is considered to be “spooky” because
no force field seems to be involved in it, but would just happen as a consequence of the linear structure of
the quantum state space.
But it seems that there is a limit in the “spookiness” that many physicists are ready to digest: it can
be spooky enough to violate Bell’s inequalities, but not so spooky to also violate the marginal laws. Why?
Because these laws are the conditions that guarantee that no faster than light communications can arise
between Alice and Bob. Still, the very idea of Alice sending a signal to Bob, or vice versa, relies on Alice
and Bob selectively acting only on their sub-entities, which in turn presupposes some sort of separateness
of these two sub-entities, which is only reasonable to assume if they would be genuine spatial entities,
as then their separation in space would be sufficient to also produce a “separation in substance.” As we
emphasized, this is however an untenable assumption, hence not only the violation of Bell’s inequalities is
to be expected, but also a violation of the no-signaling conditions should be expected, unless the system
possesses some remarkable symmetries (which can indeed be the case for the quantum micro-systems, in
case the observed violations of the no-signaling conditions would only be the result of experimental errors).
This does not imply, however, that there would be the possibility to exploit these violations in order to
produce a superluminal communication between Alice and Bob. As we will explain in this article, we
believe that a subtle logical error has been made in the standard analysis of the no-signaling conditions.
It is usually considered that since the produced correlations in a typical Bell-test situation are spacelike
separated, if they could be used to send signals, then such signals would travel faster than light, hence they
would violate relativity theory. The error in question consists in not carefully distinguishing between the
‘origin of the correlations’ and the ‘mechanism of signaling by means of such correlations’. Indeed, even if
correlations are associated with spacelike separated events, the mechanism of using them for signaling will
not necessarily lead to a faster than light propagation.
What above described leads us to consider another domain of investigation, that of human cognition,
where it was also observed that experimental situations can be created where Bell’s inequalities are violated
(Bruza et al., 2008, 2009; Aerts & Sozzo, 2011, 2014a; Bruza et al., 2015; Gronchi & Strambini, 2017; Aerts
et al., 2018a,b; Beltran & Geriente, 2019; Aerts et al., 2019). This is so because there can be more or less
strong (non-spatial) connections between different conceptual entities, depending on how much meaning
they share. In other words, meaning connections in the conceptual realm are the equivalent of the (non-
spatial) coherence-connection shared by entangled micro-physical entities, and can be exploited to create
correlations in well-designed psychological experiments. Generally, these experiments will also violate the
marginal laws, hence, in their modeling one cannot simply use the standard quantum representation, with
a single tensor product representation for all considered joint measurements.
This caused some authors to doubt that a genuine form of entanglement is at play in cognitive systems
(Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2013; Aerts, 2014; Aerts et al., 2018b). For instance, in the abstract of Cervantes
& Dzhafarov (2018), the authors write: “All previous attempts to find contextuality in a psychological
experiment were unsuccessful because of the gross violations of marginal selectivity in behavioral data,
making the traditional mathematical tests developed in quantum mechanics inapplicable.” In our opinion,
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statements of these kind rest on the aprioristic view that entanglement should be caused by some sort of
(“spooky”) information flow from Alice to Bob, or vice versa, rather than by a process where Alice and
Bob are able to jointly co-create information/meaning, by acting at once on a same whole entity, the latter
being of course a process that is expected to also generally violate the marginal laws. So, we could say
that, in a sense, the same kind of misunderstanding seems to be at play in the analysis of the entanglement
phenomenon both in the physical and psychological laboratories, when some physicists and psychologists
try to figure out what could be able to generate the observed correlations.
It is the purpose of the present paper to bring some clarity to all this, presenting the phenomenon of
entanglement and its quantum modeling, both in physical and cognitive situations, under the light of a
unified and general perspective, resulting from the work that our group has carried out in the last decades,
aimed at understanding the foundations of physical theories and of our human cognitive processes, always
bringing particular attention to the aspects that unite these two domains. To do so, in Sec. 2, we start by
describing three paradigmatic examples of bipartite systems violating the CHSH version of Bell’s inequality,
which we will use to exemplify our analysis throughout the paper. The first one (Sec. 2.1) is Bohm’s spin
model of two spin-12 entities in a singlet state. The second one (Sec. 2.2) is a variation of Aerts’ “vessels of
water” macroscopic model, which involves an elastic entity formed by multiple bands. The third example
(Sec. 2.3) is a ‘psychological model’, exploiting the meaning connection characterizing a given conceptual
combination.
In Sec. 3, we then provide a probabilistic definition of sub-measurements, and make explicit the marginal
laws (or no-signaling conditions), showing that they are obeyed in Bohm’s spin model example, because of
the assumed product (non-entangled) structure of the measurements within the customary tensor product
description of the situation, but violated in the elastic and the psychological models. In Sec. 4, we also
define the notions of compatibility and separability, showing that when all joint measurements are formed
by separate sub-measurements, both the CHSH inequality and the marginal laws are necessarily obeyed. In
Sec. 5, we continue our analysis by introducing and explaining the important distinction between correla-
tions of the first and second kind, showing that only the latter, which operate at the (non-local) level of the
whole entangled entity, are able to violate the CHSH inequality, without for this implying a superluminal
influence traveling from Alice to Bob, or vice versa, i.e., with no “spooky action at a distance” and no
violations of relativistic principles, even if the marginal laws are also violated.
In Sec. 6, we show that the standard quantum formalism allows one to model the joint measurements
even in situations where the marginal laws are disobeyed, emphasizing that a tensor product structure
is always relative to the choice of a specific isomorphism and that when the marginal laws are violated
a single isomorphism is insufficient to introduce a tensor product structure for all joint measurements.
Hence, some will necessary appear to be entangled measurements. In Sec. 7, a specific modeling example
is provided, and in Sec. 8 the issue of how and when to introduce isomorphisms in order to tensorialize
specific joint measurements is discussed, emphasizing that it should be limited to those situations where
there is evidence that the outcome-states are product states, i.e., describe a disentanglement of the system
as produced by the measurements.
In Sec. 9, we lean on the problem of the definition of sub-measurements when also the change of state
induced by them, as described by the quantum projection postulate, is taken into due consideration, em-
phasizing that in quantum mechanics sub-measurements do not arise as a simple procedure of identification
of certain outcomes. Finally, in Sec. 9, we offer a number of concluding remarks, trying to bring attention
to some important points that emerged from our analysis.
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2 Bipartite systems and joint measurements
Our discussion in this article will be limited to a particular class of systems called ‘bipartite systems’, or
‘bipartite entities’. As the name indicates, these are systems (or entities, we will use these two terms inter-
changeably in the article) of a composite nature, i.e., in which two parts, called sub-systems, or sub-entities,
can be identified at some level. When considering bipartite entities, one can adopt a “deconstructivist view-
point,” where the starting point is a single whole entity and one considers to which extent such entity can
be understood as a system formed by two parts, or a complementary “constructivist viewpoint,” where one
starts from two clearly distinguishable entities that are brought together in some way, and one considers
to which extent they can be understood as the sub-entities forming a bigger emerging composite system.
Independently of the viewpoint considered, what is important for our analysis is that the system
possesses some properties that are characteristics of a bipartite structure. For example, two electrons, even
when in a singlet (entangled) state, form a bipartite system because even though we cannot attach individual
vector-states to each one of the electrons (one can nevertheless attach individual density operator-states
(Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2016)), there are properties that remain always actual and characterize the
bipartiteness of the system, like the fact that we are in the presence of two electronic masses and two
electric charges, that the system can produce two distinct detection events on spatially separated screens,
instead of a single one, etc. In the present discussion, we will limit our analysis to three different kinds
of bipartite systems, which will help us to illustrate the different aspects of our approach to quantum
entanglement and its modeling. The first system is David Bohm’s archetypical example of two half-spins
in an entangled state. The second system is a macroscopic elastic structure presenting two distinguishable
ends, on which it is possible to act simultaneously, and the third one is a combination of two abstract
concepts, subjected to participants in a psychological experiment.
2.1 Bohm’s spin model
In the historical discussion of their paradoxical situation, EPR considered the position and momentum
observables. As we mentioned in the Introduction, David Bohm subsequently proposed a simpler situation,
which expresses the situation equally well: that of two spin-12 entities (two fermions) in a rotationally
invariant entangled state (a so-called singlet state), the wave function of which can be written as:
ψ(r1, r2)|s〉 = 1√
2
ψ(r1)ψ(r2)(|+〉 ⊗ |−〉 − |−〉 ⊗ |+〉, (1)
where ψ(r1) and ψ(r2) are the spatial components of the wave functions of the two fermions, and |+〉 and
|−〉 are the “up” and “down” eigenstates of the spin operators relative to some given spatial direction.
The spatial component ψ(r1, r2) is of course important in order to describe the evolution of the composite
entity in relation to space. However, we will focus here only on the spinorial component, being understood
that the spatial factor describes two entities emitted by a source that propagate away from each other,
with some average velocity, in opposite directions, towards some distant Stern-Gerlach apparatuses and
the associated detection screens. So, we will more simply consider that the state of the bipartite system
is:
|s〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉 ⊗ |−〉 − |−〉 ⊗ |+〉. (2)
It is worth observing that the above spin vector-state, being rotationally invariant, cannot be associated
with well-defined individual spin properties prior to the measurements (we will come back to this point
later in our discussion).
In the typical experimental setting of a Bell-test experiment, one has four joint measurements, which
we simply denote AB, AB′, A′B and A′B′. In the joint measurement AB, the spin entity moving to the
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left (let us call it the spin measured by Alice) is subjected to a Stern-Gerlach apparatus oriented along the
A-axis, whereas the spin entity moving to the right (let us call it the spin measured by Bob) is subjected
to a Stern-Gerlach apparatus whose magnet is oriented along the B-axis. The same holds for the other
three joint measurements, which use Stern-Gerlach apparatuses also oriented along the A′ and B′ axes.
If α is the angle between the A and B axes, then according to the quantum formalism the probabilities
p(A1, B1) and p(A2, B2) that Alice and Bob jointly obtain a spin up outcome, respectively jointly obtain
a spin down outcome, are:
p(A1, B1) = p(A2, B2) =
1
2 sin
2 α
2 . (3)
On the other hand, the probabilities p(A1, B2) and p(A2, B1) of Alice finding a spin up and Bob a spin
down, respectively Alice finding a spin down and Bob a spin up, are given by:
p(A1, B2) = p(A2, B1) =
1
2 sin
2 pi−α
2 =
1
2 cos
2 α
2 . (4)
If an angle α = pi4 is considered, one then finds:
p(A1, B1) = p(A2, B2) =
1
8(2−
√
2), p(A1, B2) = p(A2, B1) =
1
8(2 +
√
2). (5)
An optimal choice for the A′ and B′ measurements, maximizing the correlations, is to also consider an
angle of 3pi4 between the A and B
′ axes, and an angle of pi4 between the B and A
′ axes, with angles of pi2
between A and A′ and between B and B′; see Fig. 1. This gives the additional probabilities:
Figure 1: The four orientations of the Stern-Gerlach apparatuses used by Alice and Bob in their joint measurements, which
maximize the violation of the CHSH inequality.
p(A1, B
′
2) = p(A2, B
′
1) = p(A
′
1, B1) = p(A
′
2, B2) = p(A
′
1, B
′
1) = p(A
′
2, B
′
2) =
1
8(2−
√
2),
p(A1, B
′
1) = p(A2, B
′
2) = p(A
′
1, B2) = p(A
′
2, B1) = p(A
′
1, B
′
2) = p(A
′
2, B
′
1) =
1
8(2 +
√
2). (6)
By attributing the value +1 to the situation where both spins are either up or down, and the value −1
to the situation where one spin is up and the other spin is down, we can calculate the following ‘expectation
values’ (also called ‘correlation functions’) of the four joint measurements:
E(A,B) = p(A1, B1)− p(A1, B2)− p(A2, B1) + p(A2, B2) = − 1√2
E(A,B′) = p(A1, B′1)− p(A1, B′2)− p(A2, B′1) + p(A2, B′2) = 1√2
E(A′, B) = p(A′1, B1)− p(A′1, B2)− p(A′2, B1) + p(A′2, B2) = − 1√2
E(A′, B′) = p(A′1, B′1)− p(A′1, B′2)− p(A′2, B′1) + p(A′2, B′2) = − 1√2 . (7)
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The Clauser Horne Shimony Holt (CHSH) version of Bells inequality then says that the quantity (Clauser
et al., 1969):
CHSH ≡ E(A,B)− E(A,B′) + E(A′, B) + E(A′, B′), (8)
or similar expressions obtained by interchanging the roles of A and A′ and/or the roles of B and B′, is
bounded by:
−2 ≤ CHSH ≤ 2. (9)
Since (7) gives CHSH = − 4√
2
= −2√2 < −2, the CHSH inequality (9) is clearly violated by Bohm’s spin
model. The violation corresponds here to the value known as Tsirelson’s bound, which is a maximal value
for the quantum correlations, for as long as the no-signaling conditions are fulfilled (see Sec. 3), which
will always be the case if measurements are represented as product observables, as we will discuss in more
detail later in the article.
2.2 An elastic band model
The second kind of bipartite system that we intend to consider is a macroscopic physical entity. Note
that since the eighties of the last century, it was observed that the quantum laws are not the exclusive
prerogative of the micro-entities, or of the very low temperature regimes, being possible to describe ide-
alized macroscopic physical entities having a genuine quantum-like behavior, resulting from how certain
non-standard experiments, perfectly well-defined in operational terms, can be performed on them, giving
rise to non-Kolmogorovian probability models (Aerts, 1986; Aerts et al., 1997; Aerts, 1998, 1999; Sassoli
de Bianchi, 2013a,b). Some of these “quantum machine” models were also studied in order to better un-
derstand the phenomenon of entanglement, as it is possible to conceive classical laboratory situations able
to violate Bell’s inequalities, thus throwing some light on the possible mechanisms at the origin of the
observed correlations (Aerts, 1982, 1984, 1991; Aerts et al., 2000; Aerts, 2005; Sassoli de Bianchi, 2013b;
Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2016; Aerts et al., 2018b). Here we consider a model using breakable elastic
bands, which is a variation of previous similar models (Aerts, 2005; Sassoli de Bianchi, 2013b).
More precisely, the entity we consider, subjected to different joint measurements, is formed by n + 1
uniform elastic bands of same length d, one of which is black, and all the others are white; see Fig. 2.
It can be considered as a bipartite entity because all the elastics are aligned, parallel to each other, thus
Figure 2: A schematic representation of the ‘bundle of elastic bands’ entity on which Alice and Bob perform the four AB,
A′B, AB′ and A′B′ coincidence measurements.
presenting all their left ends to Alice and all their right ends to Bob. The four joint measurements AB,
AB′, A′B and A′B′ are then defined as follows. Measurement AB consists in Alice and Bob pulling with
force, at the same predetermined time, the black elastic. Outcomes (A1, B2) and (A2, B1) consist in Alice
collecting in this way a fragment of length greater than d/2 and Bob collecting a fragment of length less
than d/2, respectively Alice collecting a fragment of length lesser than d/2 and Bob of length greater than
d/2. Clearly, the elastics being assumed to be uniform, the associated probabilities are the same for Alice
and Bob and equal to one-half. Also, considering that outcome (A1, B1), where Alice and Bob both collect
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a fragment of length greater than d/2, and outcome (A2, B2), where Alice and Bob both collect a fragment
of length lesser than d/2, cannot be observed, we have:
p(A1, B2) = p(A2, B1) =
1
2 , p(A1, B1) = p(A2, B2) = 0. (10)
Measurement AB′ (A′B) is performed in the same way, but this time Bob (Alice) has to select in a
random way the elastic to be pulled (for instance, keeping the eyes closed). This means that it can now
either be the black one or one of the n whites, and therefore Alice and Bob will not necessarily pull the
same elastic. If they do not, they will simply collect the entire elastic, which therefore will be of length
d > d/2. So, this time we have the probabilities:
p(A′1, B1) = p(A1, B′1) =
n
n+1 , p(A
′
2, B2) = p(A2, B
′
2) = 0,
p(A′1, B2) = p(A2, B′1) = p(A1, B′2) = p(A′2, B1) =
1
2
1
n+1 . (11)
Note that for the calculation of p(A′1, B1), we observed that the probability for Alice not to grab the same
elastic grabbed by Bob, which is the black one, is given by the number n of white elastics divided by the
total number n+ 1 of elastics, i.e., nn+1 .
Finally, measurement A′B′ consists in Alice and Bob both pulling a random elastic, hence the proba-
bilities are:
p(A′1, B′1) =
n
n+1 , p(A
′
2, B
′
2) = 0, p(A
′
1, B
′
2) = p(A
′
2, B
′
1) =
1
2
1
n+1 . (12)
Note that for the calculation of p(A′1, B′1), one has to reason as follows. There are (n+1)2 ways to grab the
left and right ends of n+ 1 elastics. Among these (n+ 1)2 ways, n+ 1 of them consist in grabbing the left
and right ends of the same elastic. These events have to be excluded, as they cannot produce the outcome
(A′1, B′1). So, the events where Alice and Bob grab a different elastic, which yield the (A′1, B′1) outcome,
are (n + 1)2 − (n + 1) = n(n + 1). Dividing this number by the total number (n + 1)2 of possible events,
one obtains n(n+1)
(n+1)2
= nn+1 . For the calculation of p(A
′
1, B
′
2), one can reason as follows. Outcome (A
′
1, B
′
2)
is only possible for the n+ 1 cases where Alice and Bob grab the same elastic, and when this happens the
probability is 12 , hence p(A
′
1, B
′
2) =
1
2
1
n+1 , and the same holds of course for p(A
′
2, B
′
1).
We thus obtain the expectation values:
E(A,B) = −1, E(A,B′) = E(A′, B) = E(A′, B′) = n−1n+1 . (13)
Therefore, considering the quantity obtained by interchanging the roles of B and B′ in (8), i.e., CHSH ≡
−E(A,B) + E(A,B′) + E(A′, B) + E(A′, B′), we find:
CHSH = 1 + 3
n− 1
n+ 1
= 4
n− 12
n+ 1
. (14)
For n = 0, we have CHSH = −2, so there is no violation, as in this case all four joint measurements are
the same measurement. For n = 1, 2, we have CHSH = 1, 2, respectively, hence there is still no violation.
But for n = 3, 4, 5, 6, . . . , we have CHSH = 52 ,
14
5 , 3,
22
7 , . . . , respectively, so the inequality is violated for
n > 2, and will be maximally violated (CHSH = 4) in the n→∞ limit (in this limit, the model becomes
equivalent to the ‘vessels of water model’ introduced by one of us almost forty years ago (Aerts, 1982)).
2.3 A psychological model
Entanglement has also been identified and extensively investigated in human cognitive processes (Bruza et
al., 2008, 2009; Aerts & Sozzo, 2011, 2014a; Bruza et al., 2015; Gronchi & Strambini, 2017; Aerts et al.,
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2018a,b; Beltran & Geriente, 2019; Aerts et al., 2019). So, as a third paradigmatic situation, we consider
joint measurements performed by human participants in a psychological experiment. The system is formed
by two distinct concepts (Aerts & Sozzo, 2014a): Animal and Acts, which are combined in a specific
sentence: The Animal Acts. This sentence carries a certain meaning, which corresponds to a specification
of the state of the bipartite system formed by the two concepts Animal and Acts. A different choice of a
sentence containing the two concepts, like for instance The Animal Acts in a Strange Way, would correspond
to a different state, producing different probabilities when performing joint measurements like those we
are now going to describe. For a review of the Brussels’ operational-realistic approach to cognition, where
concepts are considered to be entities that can be in different states and be subjected to measurements
performed by cognitive entities sensitive to their meaning, like human minds, we refer the reader to Aerts
et al. (2016), and the references cited therein.
The four joint measurements AB, AB′, A′B and A′B′ are defined as follows. Measurement AB consists
in participants jointly selecting a good example for the concept Animal, from the two possibilities A1 =
Horse and A2 = Bear, and a good example for the concept Acts, from the two possibilities B1 = Growls
and B2 Whinnies. Hence, the four outcomes of AB are: The Horse Growls, The Horse Whinnies, The
Bear Growls and The Bear Whinnies; see Fig. 3. The experimental probabilities obtained in an experiment
Figure 3: A symbolic representation of a participant (in the appearance of David Bohm) performing the joint measurement
AB, selecting one among the four possible combinations of exemplars, here producing a transition from the pre-measurement
state The Animal Acts to the outcome-state The Bear Growls.
performed in 2011 (Aerts & Sozzo, 2011) give:
p(A1, B1) =
4
81 , p(A1, B2) =
51
81 , p(A2, B1) =
21
81 , p(A2, B2) =
5
81 . (15)
The joint measurement AB′ is carried over in the same way, but considering for the exemplars of Acts the
two possibilities B′1 = Snorts and B′2 = Meows. Hence, the four outcomes of AB′ are: The Horse Snorts,
The Horse Meows, The Bear Snorts and The Bear Meows, and the experimental probabilities obtained in
the 2011 experiment are:
p(A1, B
′
1) =
48
81 , p(A1, B
′
2) =
2
81 , p(A2, B
′
1) =
24
81 , p(A2, B
′
2) =
7
81 . (16)
Similarly, the joint measurement A′B considers Growls and Whinnies for the two exemplars of Acts, as in
the AB measurement, but this time A′1 = Tiger and A′2 = Cat, for the two possible choices for Animal.
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Hence, the four outcomes of A′B are: The Tiger Growls, The Tiger Whinnies, The Cat Growls and The
Cat Whinnies, and the obtained experimental probabilities were in this case:
p(A′1, B1) =
63
81 , p(A
′
1, B2) =
7
81 , p(A
′
2, B1) =
7
81 , p(A
′
2, B2) =
4
81 . (17)
Finally, in joint measurement A′B′ the four outcomes are The Tiger Snorts, The Tiger Meows, The Cat
Snorts and The Cat Meows, and the experimental probabilities obtained in the 2011 experiment are:
p(A′1, B′1) =
12
81 , p(A
′
1, B
′
2) =
7
81 , p(A
′
2, B
′
1) =
8
81 , p(A
′
2, B
′
2) =
54
81 . (18)
Calculating the expectation values (7), using the above experimental probabilities, we obtain:
E(A,B) = −3181 , E(A,B′) = 2981 , E(A′, B) = 5381 , E(A′, B′) = 5181 . (19)
Therefore, considering the quantity CHSH ≡ −E(A,B) + E(A,B′) + E(A′, B) + E(A′, B′), we have the
violation:
CHSH =
63
81
+
29
81
+
53
81
+
51
81
=
196
81
= 2 +
34
81
> 2. (20)
3 Sub-measurements and marginal selectivity
In the above three paradigmatic examples of bipartite systems violating the CHSH inequality, we have each
time defined four joint measurements AB, AB′, A′B and A′B′. These joint measurements are performed
as a whole, in a pure coincidental way. However, one can also consider in more specific terms the sub-
measurements which they are the joint of. As regards the outcome probabilities of these sub-measurements,
they can be obtained by simply identifying certain outcomes of the joint measurements of which they are
part. Consider the case of AB, whose outcomes are defined by the four couples (A1, B1), (A1, B2), (A2, B1)
and (A2, B2). Let us denote by A and B the associated sub-measurements (we will sometimes say that
these are the measurements executed by Alice and Bob, although, as we will further discuss in Sec. 9, there
are some subtleties involved when defining Alice’s and Bob’s sub-measurements in a fully operational way,
according to the quantum formalism).
Sub-measurement A can be defined as follows: it is the measurement having the two outcomes A1
and A2, such that A1 is actualized each time that either (A1, B1) or (A1, B2) are actualized, and A2 is
actualized each time that either (A2, B1) or (A2, B2) are actualized. Similarly, sub-measurement B can be
defined as the measurement having the two outcomes B1 and B2, such that B1 is actualized each time that
either (A1, B1) or (A2, B1) are actualized, and B2 is actualized each time that either (A1, B2) or (A2, B2)
are actualized. In probabilistic terms, this means that:
pB(A1) = p(A1, B1) + p(A1, B2), pB(A2) = p(A2, B1) + p(A2, B2),
pA(B1) = p(A1, B1) + p(A2, B1), pA(B2) = p(A1, B2) + p(A2, B2). (21)
Of course, we can do the same with the others three joint measurements, defining the corresponding
(marginal) sub-measurement probabilities. For AB′ we have sub-measurement A jointly performed with
sub-measurement B′:
pB′(A1) = p(A1, B
′
1) + p(A1, B
′
2), pB′(A2) = p(A2, B
′
1) + p(A2, B
′
2),
pA(B
′
1) = p(A1, B
′
1) + p(A2, B
′
1), pA(B
′
2) = p(A1, B
′
2) + p(A2, B
′
2). (22)
For the joint measurement A′B, we have sub-measurement A′ jointly performed with sub-measurement B:
pB(A
′
1) = p(A
′
1, B1) + p(A
′
1, B2), pB(A
′
2) = p(A
′
2, B1) + p(A
′
2, B2),
pA′(B1) = p(A
′
1, B1) + p(A
′
2, B1), pA′(B2) = p(A
′
1, B2) + p(A
′
2, B2). (23)
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Finally, A′B′ is the joining of the two sub-measurement A′ and B′, with marginal outcome probabilities:
pB′(A
′
1) = p(A
′
1, B
′
1) + p(A
′
1, B
′
2), pB′(A
′
2) = p(A
′
2, B
′
1) + p(A
′
2, B
′
2),
pA′(B
′
1) = p(A
′
1, B
′
1) + p(A
′
2, B
′
1), pA′(B
′
2) = p(A
′
1, B
′
2) + p(A
′
2, B
′
2). (24)
The marginal laws (also called marginal selectivity, or no-signaling conditions) are then the require-
ments that the probabilities of the different sub-measurements do not change when one changes the sub-
measurement with which they are jointly measured. More precisely, the conditions are:
pB(A1) = pB′(A1), pB(A2) = pB′(A2), pB(A
′
1) = pB′(A
′
1), pB(A
′
2) = pB′(A
′
2),
pA(B1) = pA′(B1), pA(B2) = pA′(B2), pA(B
′
1) = pA′(B
′
1), pA(B
′
2) = pA′(B
′
2). (25)
In the example of Sec. 2.1, all the marginals are equal to 12 , hence they do obey the above marginal
laws. The reason for that is that the quantum joint measurements AB, AB′, A′B and A′B′ are associated
with (tensor) product (Pauli matrix) operators σA ⊗ σB, σA′ ⊗ σB, σA ⊗ σB′ and σA′ ⊗ σB′ , which by
construction have to obey the marginal laws, as it is easy to verify by a direct calculation. Consider for
instance the probability pB(A1). Writing σA = |A1〉〈A1| − |A2〉〈A2|, and σB = |B1〉〈B1| − |B2〉〈B2|, we
have:
pB(A1) = p(A1, B1) + p(A1, B2) = 〈s| (|A1〉〈A1| ⊗ |B1〉〈B1|) |s〉+ 〈s| (|A1〉〈A1| ⊗ |B2〉〈B2|) |s〉
= 〈s| (|A1〉〈A1| ⊗ (|B1〉〈B1|+ |B2〉〈B2|)) |s〉 = 〈s| (|A1〉〈A1| ⊗ I) |s〉, (26)
which is clearly independent of B, hence pB(A1) = pB′(A1), and same for the other marginal probabilities.
What about the elastic example of Section 2.2, does it obey the marginal laws? We have:
pB(A1) =
1
2 ,
n+ 1
2
n+1 = pB′(A1), pB(A2) =
1
2 ,
1
2
1
n+1 = pB′(A2),
pB(A
′
1) =
n+ 1
2
n+1 = pB′(A
′
1), pB(A
′
2) =
1
2
1
n+1 = pB′(A
′
2),
pA(B1) =
1
2 ,
n+ 1
2
n+1 = pA′(B1), pA(B2) =
1
2 ,
1
2
1
n+1 = pA′(B2),
pA(B
′
1) =
n+ 1
2
n+1 = pA′(B
′
1), pA(B
′
2) =
1
2
1
n+1 = pA′(B
′
2). (27)
Clearly, for the trivial case n = 0, all marginal laws are obeyed, but for n > 0 some of them are violated.
Note that for n = 1, 2, the CHSH inequality is not violated, but the marginal laws are violated, hence the
two violations are not perfectly correlated in the model. Consider however that, for example:
pB′(A1)− pB(A1) = n+
1
2
n+1 − 12 = 1− 1n+1 . (28)
Hence, the degrees of the violation of the marginal laws and CHSH inequality jointly increase as n increases.
Let us also consider the psychological measurement of Sec. 2.3. We have:
pB(A1) =
55
81 6= 5081 = pB′(A1), pB(A2) = 2681 6= 3181 = pB′(A2),
pB(A
′
1) =
70
81 6= 1981 = pB′(A′1), pB(A′2) = 1181 6= 6281 = pB′(A′2),
pA(B1) =
25
81 6= 7081 = pA′(B1), pA(B2) = 5681 6= 1181 = pA′(B2),
pA(B
′
1) =
72
81 6= 2081 = pA′(B′1), pA(B′2) = 981 6= 6181 = pA′(B′2). (29)
In this example we thus have even less symmetry than in the model with the elastic bands, as all the
marginal equalities are manifestly violated.
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4 Compatibility and separability
In the previous section we have defined the outcome probabilities of Alice’s sub-measurements A, A′,
and Bob’s sub-measurements B and B′, by identifying some of the outcomes of the corresponding joint
measurements, as per (21)-(24). These relations express the ‘compatibility’ of the sub-measurements, in
the sense that the sub-measurements behave, at least probabilistically, as if they could be substituted by
one big experiment, after an identification of the corresponding outcomes. An important notion in our
discussion is that of ‘separability’. The two compatible sub-measurements A and B of a joint measurement
AB are said to be separated, with respect to a given pre-measurement state, if the following factoring
relationships holds (with the factors being independent from one another):
p(A1, B1) = p(A1)p(B1), p(A1, B2) = p(A1)p(B2),
p(A2, B1) = p(A2)p(B1), p(A2, B2) = p(A2)p(B2). (30)
Combining (30) with (21), one finds the necessary and sufficient condition for separability:
p(A1, B2)p(A2, B1) = p(A1, B1)p(A2, B2). (31)
It is easy to check that none of the three experimental situations considered in Secs. 2.1-2.3, describe sep-
arate sub-measurements. In other words, in all these situations the joint measurements reveal correlations
that violate (30) or (31).
Note that if all four joint measurementsAB, AB′, A′B andA′B′ are formed by separate sub-measurements,
then both the CHSH inequality and the marginal laws are necessarily obeyed. This is so because then the
marginal probabilities, like for instance:
pB(A1) = p(A1, B1) + p(A1, B2) = p(A1)p(B1) + p(A1)p(B2)
= p(A1)(pA(B1) + pA(B2)) = p(A1), (32)
do not depend anymore on the measurement with which they are jointly executed. It is also easy to show
that the CHSH is necessarily obeyed in this case. Indeed, we have:
E(A,B) = p(A1, B1)− p(A1, B2)− p(A2, B1) + p(A2, B2)
= p(A1)p(B1)− p(A1)p(B2)− p(A2)p(B1) + p(A2)p(B2) (33)
= [p(A1)− p(A2)][p(B1)− p(B2)] = E(A)E(B), (34)
and similarly E(A,B′) = E(A)E(B′), E(A′, B) = E(A′)E(B) and E(A′, B′) = E(A′)E(B′). Hence:
|CHSH| = |E(A,B)− E(A,B′) + E(A′, B) + E(A′, B′)|
= |E(A)E(B)− E(A)E(B′) + E(A′)E(B) + E(A′)E(B′)|
= |E(A)(E(B)− E(B′) + E(A′)(E(B)− E(B′)|
≤ |E(A)||E(B)− E(B′)|+ |E(A′)||E(B)− E(B′)|
≤ |E(B)− E(B′)|+ |E(B)− E(B′)|, (35)
where for the penultimate inequality we have used the triangle inequality, and for the last inequality the
fact that |E(A)| = |p(A1) − p(A2)| = |2p(A1) − 1| ≤ 1, and similarly |E(A′)| ≤ 1. The last expression in
(35) contains numbers that are within the interval −1 ≤ E(B), E(B′) ≤ 1, hence it is necessarily bounded
by 2, i.e., |CHSH| ≤ 2.
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5 Correlations of the first and second kind
An important aspect in the discussion of the phenomenon of entanglement (rarely taken into due account)
is the distinction between ‘correlations of the first kind’ and ‘correlations of the second kind’ (Aerts, 1990).
Consider the joint measurement AB of Sec. 2.2, where Alice and Bob jointly pull their respective ends
of the black elastic band. When they do so, the elastic (assumed to be uniform) will break with equal
probability in one of its points, which neither Alice nor Bob can predict in advance. If, say, the elastic
breaks at a distance λ from Alice’s end, Alice’s collected fragment will be of length LA = λ, whereas Bob’s
collected fragment will be of length LB = d−λ. The remarkable property of these two lengths is that their
sum LA +LB is independent of λ and is always equal to the initial (unstretched) length d of the elastic. In
other words, the two lengths LA and LB are perfectly correlated: independently of their actual value, their
sum is necessarily equal to the total length d of the initially unbroken elastic. So, the joint measurement
AB ‘creates a correlations’ or, to say it in more precise terms, ‘actualizes one among an infinite number of
potential correlations’. Indeed, each value of λ corresponds to a different couple of correlated lengths LA
and LB, and at each run of the AB measurement, because of the inevitable fluctuations in the interaction
between Alice’s and Bob’s hands and the elastic, a different value for λ will be obtained. Correlations that
are created by a joint measurement are called ‘of the second kind’, whereas if they were present prior to
the measurement, hence are only discovered and not created by a joint measurement, they are called ‘of
the first kind’. Consider the situation where the black elastic would be already broken, but we do not know
where exactly it is broken, i.e., we do not know the exact value of λ. We only know that such “hidden
variable” has a well-defined value prior to the joint measurement to be executed. We can for instance model
our lack of knowledge by means of a uniform probability distribution, so that we still have in this case, as it
was the case for the unbroken black elastic, that p(A1, B2) = p(A2, B1) =
1
2 , so that E(A,B) = −1, and we
also have E(A′, B′) = n−1n+1 . What now changes are the probabilities for the A
′B and AB′ measurements.
We have:
p(A′1, B1) =
1
2
n
n+1 , p(A
′
1, B2) =
1
2 , p(A
′
2, B1) =
1
2
1
n+1 , p(A
′
2, B2) = 0. (36)
and similarly for the AB′ measurement, so that E(A′, B) = E(A,B′) = − 1n+1 . For the quantity CHSH =
−E(A,B)+E(A,B′)+E(A′, B)+E(A′, B′), we therefore obtain: CHSH = 1− 2n+1 + n−1n+1 = 2 n−1n+1 . Clearly,
for all n we have |CHSH| ≤ 2. Considering instead CHSH = E(A,B) − E(A,B′) + E(A′, B) + E(A′, B′),
we obtain: CHSH = −1 + 1n+1 − 1n+1 + n−1n+1 = − 2n+1 , so again for all n we have |CHSH| ≤ 2. In other
words, we find that when correlations of the second kind are replaced by correlations of the first kind, the
CHSH inequality is not anymore violated.
The above example shows the crucial difference between an experimental situations where the lack
of knowledge is about correlations (of the first kind) that pre-exist the measurement processes, which
cannot give rise to a violation of the CHSH inequality, and an experimental situations where the lack
of knowledge is about correlations (of the second kind) that do not pre-exist the measurements, but are
created by them, during their executions. The former situation is that of so-called hidden-variable theories,
introducing ‘elements of reality’ describing those past factors that would have determined the correlations
in the bipartite system, already existing prior to the measurement. These correlations of the first kind
are precisely those that are filtered by Bell’s inequalities, like the CHSH inequality. The latter situation
is instead that of so-called hidden measurement “interactions,” which are assumed to be responsible for
the actualization of potential properties in quantum measurements. When measurements are of the joint
kind, i.e., they are performed on bipartite entities in a coincident way, at once, they can clearly also create
correlations, when the bipartite entity forms an undivided whole.
The existence of a general mechanism based on hidden measurement-interactions, responsible for quan-
tum indeterminism, remains of course a hypothesis in need of experimental confirmation. It is impor-
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tant however to emphasize that such possibility is inherent in the very geometry of Hilbert space, if one
adopts its ‘extended Bloch representation (EBR)’, in which the elements of reality describing the available
measurement-interactions are represented by specific simplex-structures inscribed in the Bloch sphere, al-
lowing for a simple (non-circular) derivation of the Born rule (Aerts, 1986; Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi,
2014, 2016). In other words, not only the standard quantum formalism allows, but in fact also suggests,
the process of actualization of potential properties, indicated by the projection postulate, to result from
the presence of a hidden (non-local, non-spatial) level of interaction between the measuring system and the
measured entity, which in the case of entangled systems would be responsible for the creation of correlations
at the level of the whole entangled entity.
Of course, in the elastic model, the presence of these hidden measurement-interactions is self-evident
and there are no mysteries there in how the CHSH inequality and the marginal laws are violated. Different
“ways of stretching the elastic” give rise to different non-local interactions between Alice’s and Bob’s hands
and the elastic, which in turn will produce different breaking points, thus creating different correlations.
It is important to observe that the joint action of Alice and Bob is exerted at the level of the entire
elastic entity. There are no direct or indirect influences exerted by Alice’s sub-measurements on Bob’s
sub-measurements, or vice versa, there are just global joint measurements, operated at the level of the
whole bipartite structure, at once, in a non decompositional way, hence the absence of factorizability of the
joint probabilities evidenced by the violation of the CHSH inequality and the additional possible violation
of the marginal laws. To put it in a different way, there is nothing traveling from Alice to Bob, or from
Bob to Alice, no “spooky action at a distance,” no superluminal communication of one part of the elastic
instructing the other part how to behave.
The situation described in the elastic model, and also subtended by the quantum formalism (when the
projection postulate is taken seriously and the further elucidation provided by the EBR is considered), is
also what seems to happen, mutatis mutandis, in human minds participating in a psychological experiments,
like the one described in Sec. 2.3, where two concepts – Animal and Acts – are combined to form a bipartite
entity in a given meaning state, described by the specific sentence in which the two concepts are combined,
here the very simple sentence: The Animal Acts. Even though the joint measurements are about associating
different exemplars to the two conceptual entities, this operation is not performed by Alice (assuming Alice
would be responsible to select the exemplar for the Animal sub-entity) in a way that would be separated
from the operation performed by Bob (assuming Bob would be responsible to select an exemplar for the
Acts sub-entity), so much so that one would be allowed to introduce notions like “the direct or indirect
influence of Alice’s sub-measurement on Bob’s sub-measurements, and vice versa.” Indeed, each participant
in the experiment performs the joint measurements as whole measurements, at once, considering the entire
meaning of the The Animal Acts sentence in relation to its four possible outcome-states, which in the case
of the AB measurement are the outcomes The Horse Growls, The Horse Whinnies, The Bear Growls and
The Bear Whinnies. This is very similar to the two hands jointly pulling the two ends of the black elastic
band: they are not influencing or communicating with one another, they are simply “working in unison.”
Again, there is no Alice’s measurement influencing (directly or indirectly) Bob’s measurement, there
is no action at a distance between the two sub-entities, or sub-measurements: there is just a single whole
entity with a bipartite structure which is acted upon by a single measurement process – for clarity, let
us call it David’s measurement – which in a sense can be understood as the joining of Alice and Bob
sub-measurements, because it implies a choice to be jointly made on Animal and Acts, simultaneously,
in the same way that for the model of Sec. 2.2, to perform the AB measurement, the black elastic needs
to be jointly and simultaneously pulled from both sides. But the effective action is on the totality of
the elastic entity, in the same way that David, in the psychological measurement, acts on the totality of
the The Animal Acts conceptual entity, and there would be no sense in trying to frame the experimental
process in terms of possible mutual influences of Alice’s action on Bob’s action, and vice versa. Because,
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in ultimate analysis, there are no separated processes to be associated with Alice (corresponding to the
choice of an exemplar for Animal) and Bob (corresponding to the choice of an exemplar for Acts), there
is only a ‘single mind process’, that of David, describing the collective participant in the psychological
measurement, selecting at once both exemplars (fore the notion of ‘collective participant’, see Aerts et al.
(2019)).
Coming back to the joint measurement AB on the elastic band entity, note that from the local viewpoint
of Alice and Bob, outcomes become available to them at the same time, and if the elastic is long enough,
these two events will be spacelike separated. However, nothing travels at speed greater than light, as
it requires time for the two elastic fragments to reach Alice’s and Bob’s hands (or David’s hands, if
the experiment is performed by a single individual). The same can be expected to be the case also
with micro-physical entangled entities, like electrons and photons: even if the final detection events are
spacelike separated, this does not necessarily imply that there is the propagation of a superluminal influence.
Therefore, the observed violations of the marginal laws should not necessarily raise concern regarding
possible violations of Einsteinian relativity. Independently of the above, the situation in the psychology
laboratory is of course also different from that of a physics laboratory, as is clear that there are no principles
equivalent to the relativistic one that would make one expect marginal selectivity to generally apply. This
also because, when two conceptual entities are combined, and their possible exemplars are jointly selected,
this only happens in the mind of a single subject, not in a spatial environment equipped with specific
symmetries (see also the additional discussion in Sec. 10).
6 Hilbertian modeling
When some of the marginal laws are violated, in addition to the CHSH inequality, we must proceed more
carefully in the Hilbert space modeling of the situation. Indeed, as we showed it explicitly in the Bohm
example, if the joint measurements are represented by ‘product operators’ in the tensor product of the
Hilbert spaces of the sub-entities, the marginal laws will be satisfied (see Sec. 3). However, we should not
forget that in addition to introducing a tensor product starting from the state spaces of the sub-entities, it
is also possible to introduce it with respect to their operator spaces, allowing in this way for a much more
general tensor product construction. It can be proven that the set of linear operators on the tensor product
of the state space of the joint entity is isomorphic to the tensor product of the sets of linear operators on
the state spaces of the sub-entities. This means that from a mathematical perspective, when confronted
with the presence of entanglement due to a violation of the CHSH inequality, there is no reason to prefer
to model it in terms of an entangled state, i.e., of an element of the tensor product of the state spaces
of the sub-entities, or in terms of an entangled measurement, i.e., of an element of the tensor product of
the operator spaces of the sub-entities. Indeed, as we will show in the following of the article, and as we
put forward in Aerts & Sozzo (2014a,b,c), when in addition to the violation of the CHSH inequality the
marginal laws are also violated, this indicates that entanglement can also be present in the measurements,
hence be mathematically modeled by entangled self-adjoint operators, rather than only in the state, where
it can be mathematically modeled by an entangled state.
But let us analyse the situation carefully, starting from the more common way of introducing the tensor
product at the level of the state spaces of the sub-systems. We can also then see very explicitly that it is
indeed possible to model the situation by considering a larger class of measurements of the non-product
kind, which we have called ‘entangled measurements’ (Aerts & Sozzo, 2014a,b,c). In other words, when the
marginal laws are violated, one cannot model entanglement only at the level of the state of the bipartite
system and, as we will analyse in detail in the following, in many experimental situations some of the
measurements are also to be considered as entangled.
Let us denote by H the complex Hilbert space describing the states of the bipartite system under study.
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For the three examples that we considered in Sections 2.1-2.3, H is typically a 4-dimensional Hilbert space,
which we will now assume to be the case, i.e., a Hilbert space whose orthonormal bases have four elements.
More precisely, let us denote x1, x2, x3 and x4 the four states forming one of the basis of H, which from
now on we will represent as orthonormal kets {|x1〉, . . . , |x4〉}, 〈xj |xj〉 = δij , i, j = 1, ..., 4, using Dirac’s
notation. Let us then also consider a state p, represented by the normalized ket |p〉 ∈ H, 〈p|p〉 = 1. Is
it an entangled state or a product state? A question of this kind cannot be answered on itself, but only
with reference to a tensorial representation of H. More precisely, one has first to introduce an isomorphism
I between H and another (isomorphic) Hilbert space K, having the tensorial structure: K = HA ⊗ HB.
Then, the previous question can be more precisely stated as follows: Is the state p, represented by the ket
|p〉, an entangled state with respect to the isomorphism I?
Before continuing, let us recall that an isomorphism I between two Hilbert spacesH and K is a surjective
linear map, I : H → K, preserving the inner product, i.e., 〈p|q〉H = 〈I(p)|I(q)〉K, where 〈·|·〉H and 〈·|·〉K
denote the scalar products in H and K, respectively. Note that this automatically implies that I is also
injective, i.e., that I is a bijection.2 So, the answer to the above question is that p is an ‘entangled state
with respect to I’ if it is not a ‘product state with respect to I’, that is, if there are no two states represented
by the kets |pA〉 ∈ HA and |pB〉 ∈ HB, such that one could write: I|p〉 = |pA〉 ⊗ |pB〉. Similarly, one can
ask if a joint measurement AB is an ‘entangled measurement’, and again the question has to be addressed
in relation to a specific isomorphism I. So, the answer is that a joint measurement AB, represented by a
given (here bounded) self-adjoint linear operator EAB ∈ L(H), is an ‘entangled measurement with respect
to I’ if it is not a ‘product measurement with respect to I’, that is, if there are no two sub-measurements
A and B, represented by the self-adjoint linear operators EA ∈ L(HA) and EB ∈ L(HB), respectively, such
that one could write: IEABI−1 = EA ⊗ EB. An important observation is that, given a joint measurement
AB, one can always find a tailor-made isomorphism IAB : H → HA ⊗HB, such that, with respect to IAB,
AB is a product measurement. This is easy to prove by introducing two observables EA ∈ L(HA) and
EB ∈ L(HB), with spectral decompositions EA = a1PA1 + a2PA2 and EB = b1PB1 + b2PB2 , respectively,
where a1 and a2 are the eigenvalues of EA, and PA1 = |A1〉〈A1| and PA2 = |A2〉〈A2| are the associated
one-dimensional projection operators, and similarly for EB. We thus have:
EA ⊗ EB = (a1PA1 + a2PA2)⊗ (b1PB1 + b2PB2)
= a1b1PA1 ⊗ PB1 + a1b2PA1 ⊗ PB2 + a2b1PA2 ⊗ PB1 + a2b2PA2 ⊗ PB2 . (37)
Introducing also the spectral decomposition
EAB = ab11PA1B1 + ab12PA1B2 + ab21PA2B1 + ab22PA2B2 , (38)
where the abij and the PAiBj = |AiBj〉〈AiBj |, i, j = 1, 2, are the eigenvalues and associated one-dimensional
projection operators of EAB ∈ L(H), one can then define the isomorphism IAB by simply specifying its
action on the four eigenstates of EAB, or the associated projection operators:
IAB|AiBj〉 = |Ai〉 ⊗ |Bj〉, IABPAiBjI−1AB = PAi ⊗ PBj , i, j = 1, 2. (39)
Eq. (37) can then be rewritten as:
I−1ABEA ⊗ EBIAB = a1b1PAiB1 + a1b2PA1B2 + a2b1PA2B1 + a2b2PA2B2 = EAB, (40)
where the last equality follows from the fact that given four real numbers abij , i, j = 1, 2, one can always
write them as products abij = ajbj , for well chosen ai and bj , i, j = 1, 2.
2Note that by definition I is an isometric operator and that for finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, which will be the case in
our discussion, I is also necessarily a unitary operator.
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Consider now two joint measurementsAB andAB′, represented by the self-adjoint operators EAB, EAB′ ∈
L(H). Let IAB be the isomorphism allowing to represent AB as a product measurement, i.e., EAB =
I−1ABEA⊗EBIAB. Can we also have EAB′ = I−1ABEA⊗EB′IAB, i.e., can we represent both measurements AB
and AB′ as product measurements, with respect to a same isomorphism? This is what is usually consid-
ered to be the case in typical quantum situations, like in the Bohm’s spin model, where a unique tensorial
representation is introduced from the beginning, and all joint observables are constructed to be product
observables with respect to that same tensorial representation. As we have shown already in (26), when all
joint measurements are product measurements, the marginal laws have to be satisfied. This means that if
they are not, we cannot find a same isomorphism I = IAB = IAB′ that would allow to represent both AB
and AB′ as product measurements. Indeed:
p(A1, B1) + p(A1, B2) = 〈p|(PA1B1 + PA1B2)|p〉 = 〈p|I−1I(PA1B1 + PA1B2)I−1I|p〉
= 〈p|I−1(PA1 ⊗ PB1 + PA1 ⊗ PB2)I|p〉 = 〈p|I−1PA1 ⊗ (PB1 + PB2)I|p〉
= 〈p|I−1PA1 ⊗ (PB′1 + PB′2)I|p〉 = 〈p|I−1(PA1 ⊗ PB′1 + PA1 ⊗ PB′2)I|p〉
= 〈p|I−1I(PA1B′1 + PA1B′2)I−1I|p〉 = 〈p|(PA1B′1 + PA1B′2)|p〉
= p(A1, B
′
1) + p(A1, B
′
2), (41)
i.e, the existence of such isomorphism requires the marginal laws to be satisfied. And since they are generally
not, one is forced to adopt a more general representation where not all measurements are necessarily of
the product form.
In general, one can introduce four different isomorphisms, IAB, IA′B, IAB′ and IA′B′ , associated with
the four joint measurements AB, A′B, AB′ and A′B′, respectively, such that EAB = I−1ABEA ⊗ EBIAB,
EA′B = I−1A′BEA′ ⊗ EBIA′B, EAB′ = I−1AB′EA ⊗ EB′IAB′ and EA′B′ = I−1A′B′EA′ ⊗ EB′IA′B′ . In other words, AB
is a product measurement with respect to IAB, A
′B is a product measurement with respect to IA′B, AB′
is a product measurement with respect to IAB′ , and A
′B′ is a product measurement with respect to IA′B′ .
However, AB will not in general be a product measurement with respect to IA′B, IAB′ and IA′B′ ; A
′B will
not in general be a product measurement with respect to IAB, IAB′ and IA′B′ ; AB
′ will not in general be
a product measurement with respect to IAB, IA′B and IA′B′ ; and A
′B′ will not in general be a product
measurement with respect to IAB, IA′B and IAB′ . To put it differently, if one wants to force a tensor
product representation for all the four joint measurements AB, A′B, AB′ and A′B′, this is possible, but
the price to be paid is that the representation will then become contextual, in the sense that entanglement
will have to be incorporated into states that are in general different for each one of the joint measurements,
i.e., the states IAB|p〉, IA′B|p〉, IAB′ |p〉 and IA′B′ |p〉, respectively.
7 A simple modeling example
It is instructive at this point to provide an example of an explicit Hilbertian modeling. For simplicity, we
only consider the elastic band model presented of Sec. 2.2, in the limit n → ∞, of maximal violation of
the CHSH inequality. For an explicit Hilbertian representation of the psychological model of Sec. 2.3, we
refer the reader to Aerts & Sozzo (2014a); see also the Hilbert space modeling provided in Aerts et al.
(2019), relative to a recently performed test on the co-occurrences of two concepts and their combination
in retrieval processes on specific corpuses of documents.
So, the marginal laws being violated, we cannot describe all joint measurements as product measure-
ments with respect to a same isomorphism. Let us choose the eigenvectors of EAB to be the vectors of the
canonical basis of H = C4, that is:
|A1B1〉 = |1, 0, 0, 0〉, |A1B2〉 = |0, 1, 0, 0〉, |A2B1〉 = |0, 0, 1, 0〉, |A2B2〉 = |0, 0, 0, 1〉. (42)
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Then, we can write the pre-measurement state as the superposition state:
|p〉 = 1√
2
|0, 1, 1, 0〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 1, 0, 0〉+ |0, 0, 1, 0〉), (43)
which clearly gives the correct probabilities:
p(A1, B1) = |〈1, 0, 0, 0|p〉|2 = 0, p(A1, B2) = |〈0, 1, 0, 0|p〉|2 = 12 ,
p(A2, B1) = |〈0, 0, 1, 0|p〉|2 = 12 , p(A2, B2) = |〈0, 0, 0, 1|p〉|2 = 0. (44)
Considering the isomorphism IAB and the observable EAB, defined as:
IAB|1, 0, 0, 0〉 = |1, 0〉 ⊗ |1, 0〉, IAB|0, 1, 0, 0〉 = |1, 0〉 ⊗ |0, 1〉,
IAB|0, 0, 1, 0〉 = |0, 1〉 ⊗ |1, 0〉, IAB|0, 0, 0, 1〉 = |0, 1〉 ⊗ |0, 1〉,
EAB =
∑2
i,j=1 abij |AiBj〉〈AiBj |, abij = δiδj , δ1 = 1, δ2 = −1, (45)
such that E(A,B) = 〈p|EAB|p〉, we can write:
IABEABI−1AB = IAB(|1, 0, 0, 0〉〈1, 0, 0, 0| − |0, 1, 0, 0〉〈0, 1, 0, 0|
−|0, 0, 1, 0〉〈0, 0, 1, 0|+ |0, 0, 0, 1〉〈0, 0, 0, 1|)I−1AB
= |1, 0〉 ⊗ |1, 0〉〈1, 0| ⊗ 〈1, 0| − |1, 0〉 ⊗ |0, 1〉〈1, 0| ⊗ 〈0, 1|
−|0, 1〉 ⊗ |1, 0〉〈0, 1| ⊗ 〈1, 0|+ |0, 1〉 ⊗ |0, 1〉〈0, 1| ⊗ 〈0, 1|
= (|1, 0〉〈1, 0| − |0, 1〉〈0, 1|)⊗ (|1, 0〉〈1, 0| − |0, 1〉〈0, 1|) = σz ⊗ σz, (46)
where σz is Pauli’s z-matrix, such that σz|1, 0〉 = |1, 0〉 and σz|0, 1〉 = −|0, 1〉. So, the two sub-measurements
A and B can be represented, with respect to IAB, using the same operator EA = EB = σz, and we have the
quantum average:
E(A,B) = 〈p|EAB|p〉 = 〈p|I−1ABIABEABI−1ABIAB|p〉 = 〈p|I−1ABσz ⊗ σzIAB|p〉
=
1
2
(〈1, 0| ⊗ 〈0, 1|+ 〈0, 1| ⊗ 〈1, 0|)σz ⊗ σz(|1, 0〉 ⊗ |0, 1〉+ |0, 1〉 ⊗ |1, 0〉)
= −1
2
− 1
2
= −1. (47)
Let us now also model measurement AB′. We can consider in this case the eigenvectors:
|A1B′1〉 =
1√
2
|0, 1, 1, 0〉, |A1B′2〉 =
1√
2
|0, 1,−1, 0〉, |A2B′1〉 = |1, 0, 0, 0〉, |A2B′2〉 = |0, 0, 0, 1〉, (48)
which clearly give the correct probabilities:
p(A1, B
′
1) = | 1√2〈0, 1, 1, 0|p〉|2 = |〈p|p〉|2 = 1, p(A1, B′2) = |
1√
2
〈0, 1,−1, 0|p〉|2 = 0,
p(A2, B
′
1) = |〈1, 0, 0, 0|p〉|2 = 0, p(A2, B′2) = |〈0, 0, 0, 1|p〉|2 = 0. (49)
For the self-adjoint operator EAB′ , describing AB′, we have the spectral decomposition:
EAB′ =
2∑
i,j=1
ab′ij |AiB′j〉〈AiB′j |, ab′ij = δiδj , δ1 = 1, δ2 = −1, (50)
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and of course E(A,B′) = 〈p|EAB′ |p〉 = 1. However, the isomorphism IAB cannot be used now to also write
EAB′ in a tensor product form, as is clear that the eigenvectors |A1B′1〉 and |A1B′2〉 are entangled vectors
with respect to IAB.
The operators EA′B and EA′B′ can be taken to be identical to EAB′ , so that the Bell operator:
ECHSH = −EAB + EAB′ + EA′B + EA′B′ = −EAB + 3EAB′ (51)
can be explicitly written in the canonical basis:
ECHSH =

−1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1
+ 3

−1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
 =

−4 0 0 0
0 1 3 0
0 3 1 0
0 0 0 2
 . (52)
If we calculate the expectation value CHSH = 〈 p|ECHSH|p〉, we thus find:
CHSH =
1√
2
(
0 1 1 0
)
−4 0 0 0
0 1 3 0
0 3 1 0
0 0 0 2
 1√2

0
1
1
0
 = 4, (53)
in accordance with (14), as n→∞.
8 Product or entangled measurements?
In the previous sections, we have seen that entanglement, both for states and measurements, has to be de-
fined relative to a given isomorphism, specifying a tensorial representation. This means that entanglement
is a contextual property that depends on the way sub-structures are identified in a composite system. In
some experimental circumstances, the way such identification has to be carried out can be dictated by the
very geometry of the setting. For instance, it appears natural in a typical Bohm model situation, where
Alice and Bob operate two distinct Stern-Gerlach apparatuses separated by an arbitrarily large spatial
distance, to introduce a product representation for their joint measurements. However, what appears to
be natural might not necessarily be correct. Indeed, in view of the numerous observed violations of the
no-signaling conditions in Bell-test experiments (Adenier & Khrennikov, 2007; De Raedt et al., 2012, 2013;
Adenier & Khrennikov, 2017; Bednorz, 2017; Kupczynski, 2017), one may wonder to which extent the
fact that the overall measuring apparatus is formed by two spatially separated instruments, producing
outcomes in a coincident way, would be sufficient to characterize all the considered joint measurements as
product measurements with respect to a same tensor product representation, i.e., a same isomorphism and
therefore also a same pre-measurement state.
When entanglement was initially theorized, physicists were not expecting that correlations could man-
ifest independently of the distance separating Alice’s and Bob’s measuring apparatuses. This means that
when a bipartite entity is in an entangled state, even if a joint measurement is represented by means of a
product operator EA ⊗ EB, this does not mean that the corresponding sub-measurements would be sepa-
rated, i.e., would obey (30), this being the case only when the system is in a product state. In other words,
product measurements are not separated measurements, when entanglement is present in the system. Now,
what we observed in Sec. 6, is that there is some freedom in the way such non-separability of the joint
measurements (reflecting the non-separability of the bipartite entity) can be modeled within the Hilbert
space formalism. At the “local level” of a given joint measurement, one can always contextually consider a
specific isomorphism that will be able to push all the entanglement resource in the state. However, this will
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generally only work contextually for that specific joint measurement, and not for all joint measurements
that can be defined and performed on the system.
So, contextually, by considering a suitable isomorphism, one can always assert that ‘entanglement is
just in the state’, and not also in the joint measurement, i.e., that the notion of ‘entangled states’ is
sufficient to describe the fact that a bipartite system forms an interconnected whole, so that one does not
need to also consider a notion of ‘entangled measurements’, to properly describe the situation. As we are
going to explain, this way of proceeding remains consistent only if one can consider the outcome-states to
be product states, which however is something that might not be true for all experimental situations. But
let us for a moment assume that the outcome-states are correctly described as product states. It becomes
then possible to support the following view. First, one observes that the presence of entanglement in the
system manifests at the level of the probabilities in such a way that the joint probabilities cannot be written
as the products (30). Of course, this is a consequence of entanglement, i.e., a necessary condition for it,
not a sufficient one, and it is precisely one of the merits of John Bell to have identified conditions able to
characterize the presence of entanglement, via his inequalities, combining the probabilistic data obtained
from different joint measurements, so as to demarcate correlations of the first kind from those of the second
kind. But of course, entanglement will manifest its presence in each joint measurement, as the source of
the non-factorizability of the corresponding joint probabilities.
Now, the very notion of entanglement implicitly contains the idea that we are in the presence of a
bipartite system, i.e., a system formed by two parts that, precisely, have been entangled and therefore do
form a whole. Such bipartite structure can then be implemented in the formalism by describing a given joint
measurement performed on the entity as a product measurement. This has the consequence that outcome-
states will be modeled as product states, i.e., that the measurement process will have to be understood
as a process of disentanglement of the previously entangled sub-entities (as implied by the projection
postulate). So, the tensor product is to be viewed as a mathematical procedure of recognition of the
bipartite structure of the system, in the context of a given joint measurement that takes the interconnected
system and produces its disconnection, creating in this way the correlations. When we only focus on the
situation of ‘one state and one joint measurement’, this ‘tensor product procedure’ presents no specific
problems, as is clear that one can always find a well-defined isomorphism that can do the job of pushing
all the entanglement in the state (see Sec. 6). However, when more than a single joint measurement is
considered, and these measurements do not obey the marginal laws, we have seen that the associated
isomorphisms, implementing for each of them the tensor product structure, will not coincide. When they
do coincide, i.e., when the marginal laws are obeyed, one can of course forget about the different possible
ways of introducing tensor product structures, and just start from the beginning with a given tensor
product representation for the state space, as is usually done in quantum mechanics, where the validity
of the no-signaling conditions is taken for granted. But when marginal selectivity is not satisfied, one is
forced to conclude that the tensor product structure can only be locally applied to each one of the joint
measurements, and not globally applied to all joint measurements.
On could be tempted to consider the above as a shortcoming of the quantum Hilbertian formalism,
however, another possibility is to simply consider this as the signature of a more complex underlying reality.
Consider the example of a curved surface imbedded in R3. Each point of it can be locally associated with
a two-dimensional tangent plane, but one cannot define a global tangent plane, i.e., a plane that would be
tangent to all points of the curved surface. The situation could be here analogous: each isomorphism can
locally produce a simpler tensor product structure, which however cannot be applied to all measurement
situations, because the system would not possess enough symmetries for this to be possible. We could say
that when the marginal laws are obeyed, the system (understood here as the entity plus its collection of
relevant measurements) is as close as possible to the situation of two genuinely separated systems,3 where
3Note that because of the superposition principle, quantum mechanics does not allow for the description of fully separated
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the presence of the sub-systems is recognizable in a much stronger way than when marginal selectivity is
not satisfied. In other words, the idea is that when marginal selectivity is not satisfied, the tensor product
procedure of recognition of sub-systems would not be given once for all, but needs to be fine-tuned with
respect to each joint measurement considered. Otherwise, if one forces a single tensor product structure onto
the system, say via the isomorphism IAB, the other joint measurements will become, from the perspective
of that IAB, entangled measurements. However, if they produce transitions that disentangle the system
(like when by pulling an elastic band it gets broken and separated into two fragments), such description by
means of a single isomorphism is to be considered as non-optimal, as it makes certain measurements appear
as if they would be entangled, whereas in practice they would produce a factual disentanglement of the
previously entangled system. But again, their “entangled appearance” would only be due to the specific
isomorphism used, and when reverting to a better fine-tuned isomorphism, each measurement can always
be “locally” conveniently transformed into a product measurement, giving rise to product outcome-states
(relative to that specific isomorphism).
The above discussion is pertinent only in situations such that there is a way to ascertain that the
considered joint measurements give rise to product outcome-states, i.e., states that cannot be used any-
more to violate the CHSH inequality, which therefore should be properly represented as tensor product
vectors. However, there certainly are situations where the outcome-states of a joint measurement are to be
considered to remain entangled states.4 Consider the cognitive model of Sec. 2.3. Take the four outcome-
states of the joint measurement AB, described by the conceptual combinations: The Horse Growls, The
Horse Whinnies, The Bear Growls and The Bear Whinnies. These are more concrete states than the
pre-measurement state, The Animal Acts, but can still be considered to be entangled states of the compos-
ite entity formed by the joining of the two individual entities Animal and Acts. Indeed, in the cognitive
domain, what the quantum structure of entanglement captures, not only mathematically but also conceptu-
ally, is the presence of a ‘meaning connection’ between the different concepts. The two concepts Horse and
Whinnies are strongly meaning connected, hence one could make the case that their combination should
still be represented as an entangled state, and not as a product state. The meaning connection between
Bear and Whinnies is instead much more feeble, hence The Bear Whinnies is to be considered to be a
less entangled state than The Horse Whinnies. Now, every time there is a meaning connection between
concepts, in a given conceptual combination, one can certainly conceive joint measurements extracting
correlations from it and by doing so violate the CHSH inequality.
Therefore, for cognitive measurements the situation is that ‘entangled measurements’ would be the
default way to represent the situation of joint measurements that can truly preserve the wholeness (or part
of the wholeness) of the measured conceptual entity, and not mere mathematical artefacts resulting from an
inappropriate choice of the isomorphism introducing a tensor product structure.5 In this kind of situation,
there is of course a lot of freedom in the choice of the isomorphism, as different criteria can certainly be
adopted. Typically, one will consider for the pre-measurement state a maximally symmetric and entangled
state, like a singlet state, so that the outcome-states of the different entangled measurements can reflect
in a natural way the higher or lower meaning connection that is carried by the different combination of
exemplars, which in turn translates in the fact that these outcome-states will be more or less entangled
(Aerts & Sozzo, 2014a; Aerts et al., 2019). So, one should not expect to find within the quantum formalism
systems (see Sassoli de Bianchi (2019a) and the references cited therein), which is the reason why we say “as close as possible,”
i.e., within the limits of what the Hilbertian formalism allows to model in terms of separation.
4An example of entangled measurements is the so-called Bell-state measurements, in quantum teleportation, where two
given qubits are collapsed onto one of the four entangled states known as Bell states (Bennett et al., 1993).
5In the domain of macroscopic models, an example of joint measurements preserving the entanglement connection was
described in Sassoli de Bianchi (2014), with an idealized experimental situation of two prisms connected through a rigid
rod, glued on their opposed polygon-faces, which were jointly rolled in order to create correlations able to violate the CHSH
inequality, however preserving their interconnection through the rigid rod.
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a ‘unique recognition procedure’ in the description of the structure of a bipartite system subjected to joint
measurements, i.e., a unique recipe for choosing one or multiple isomorphisms, with respect to which entan-
glement at the level of the states and/or measurements can be defined. Each situation requires an attentive
analysis and interpretation, based on the nature of the outcome-states of the different measurements, from
which a suitable representation can then be adopted.
9 More on sub-measurements
In Sec. 3, we defined the two sub-measurements A and B of a joint measurement AB by a simple procedure
of identification of certain outcomes. For instance, we defined sub-measurement A as the measurement
having Ai, i = 1, 2, as its outcomes, where Ai is actualized each time that either (Ai, B1) or (Ai, B2)
are actualized, when performing AB, so that pB(Ai) = p(Ai, B1) + p(Ai, B2), i = 1, 2, and same for the
outcomes of B; see (21). In standard quantum mechanics, however, this is not how the sub-measurements of
a joint measurement are usually described. Indeed, if A would be just obtained by performing the “bigger”
measurement AB, then simply identifying two by two its outcomes, A should collapse the pre-measurement
state to exactly the same set of outcome-states as AB does, as operationally speaking A and AB would be
executed in exactly the same way. However, using the same notation as in Sec. 6, the standard quantum
formalism tells us to represent the two sub-measurements A and B by the following operators:
E˜A = a1(PA1B1 + PA1B2) + a2(PA2B1 + PA2B2),
E˜B = b1(PA1B1 + PA2B1) + b2(PA1B2 + PA2B2). (54)
The “tilded notation” is here used to distinguish E˜A, E˜B ∈ L(H), which act on the whole Hilbert space H,
from the operators EA ∈ L(HA) and EB ∈ L(HB), introduced in Sec. 6, which only act on the sub-spaces
HA and HB, in a given tensorial decomposition of H.
So, according to the projection postulate, if |p〉 is the pre-measurement state, when performing the
sub-measurement A, represented by operator E˜A, the two possible outcome-states are:
(PA1B1 + PA1B2)|p〉
‖(PA1B1 + PA1B2)|p〉‖
,
(PA2B1 + PA2B2)|p〉
‖(PA2B1 + PA2B2)|p〉‖
. (55)
Similarly, the two possible outcome-states of sub-measurement E˜B are:
(PA1B1 + PA2B1)|p〉
‖(PA1B1 + PA2B1)|p〉‖
,
(PA1B2 + PA2B2)|p〉
‖(PA1B2 + PA2B2)|p〉‖
. (56)
Clearly, these four outcome-states are superpositions of the four outcome-states of AB, which are:
PA1B1 |p〉
‖PA1B1 |p〉‖
,
PA1B2 |p〉
‖PA1B2 |p〉‖
,
PA2B1 |p〉
‖PA2B1 |p〉‖
,
PA2B2 |p〉
‖PA2B2 |p〉‖
. (57)
Note however that since (see also (37)):
EAB = E˜AE˜B = E˜B E˜A = a1b1PA1B1 + a1b2PA1B2 + a2b1PA2B1 + a2b2PA2B2 , (58)
even though E˜A and E˜B project onto different outcome-states than those of EAB, when considered individ-
ually, if their processes are combined the same set of outcome-states (57) will be consistently obtained.
This can be easily seen by considering a situation where it makes sense to consider that A and B are per-
formed in a sequence, one after the other (the sub-measurements being compatible, the order is irrelevant).
Imagine that after performing first sub-measurement A, the outcome-state associated with the eigenvalue
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a1 has been obtained (the first vector-state in (55)). If this outcome-state becomes the pre-measurement
state for the subsequent measurement B, inserting it at the place of |p〉 in (56), then observing that
(PA1B1 + PA2B1)(PA1B1 + PA1B2) = PA1B1 , (PA1B2 + PA2B2)(PA1B1 + PA1B2) = PA1B2 , (59)
we clearly obtain the first two vectors in (57) as possible outcome-states. Similarly, if the outcome-state
of A is that associated with the eigenvalue a2 (the second vector-state in (55)), observing that
(PA1B1 + PA2B1)(PA2B1 + PA2B2) = PA2B1 , (PA1B2 + PA2B2)(PA2B1 + PA2B2) = PA2B2 , (60)
we now obtain the last two vectors in (57) as possible outcome-states.
Let us now consider the example given in Sec. 2.3, of the psychological measurements with the bipartite
conceptual entity formed by the two concepts Animal and Acts, in the state described by the conceptual
combination The Animal Acts. Can we specify the two sub-measurements A and B in more specific terms,
also describing the way they individually change the initial state, so as to obtain a description in full
compliance with how sub-measurements are defined in quantum mechanics? The answer is affirmative,
and to show how we have to come back to the figure of David that we introduced in Sec. 7, to express
the fact that the joint measurements resulted from a single mind process (David being understood as the
collective participant acting at once on the totality of the bipartite conceptual entity), and not from the
combination of two separate mind processes, those of Alice and Bob. In other words, to see how the
two sub-measurements A and B can be described, in a way that remains consistent with the statistics of
outcomes generated by David, we have to consider some additional processes that transform the outcome-
states (57) of AB into the superposition states (55) and (56) corresponding to the outcome-states of A and
B, respectively.
Starting from David’s measurement AB, we now have to disjoin it into two sub-measurements, A and
B, associated with the figures of Alice and Bob. Clearly, the latter will have to be associated with the
marginal probabilities only, and will therefore contain less information, when considered individually, than
their join, hence a process of erasure must be considered to go from the whole joint measurement to the
associated sub-measurements, and it is precisely this erasure (of information) process that can explain why
the sub-measurements’ outcome-states have to be described as superposition states (in the same way in
delayed choice quantum eraser experiments one recovers the interference pattern when the “which-path”
information is erased (Yoon-Ho Kim et al., 2000; Walborn et al., 2002; Aerts, 2009b)). So, consider the
situation of measurement AB, with David collecting the four outcomes (A1, B1), (A1, B2), (A2, B1) and
(A2, B2), corresponding to the four conceptual combinations The Horse Growls, The Horse Whinnies, The
Bear Growls and The Bear Whinnies. To define the sub-measurements A and B, we have to consider two
additional processes, where David sends information about the outcomes to Alice and Bob, but does so
taking care to erase information about the chosen exemplar of Acts, when informing Alice, and about the
chosen exemplar for Animal, when informing Bob. More precisely, assuming that the outcome was, say,
The Horse Growls, David will communicate the following to Alice:
An Exemplar For The Combination “The Animal Acts” Has Been Selected Among The Four
Following Possibilities: “The Horse Growls,” “The Horse Whinnies,” “The Bear Growls” and
“The Bear Whinnies,” And It Contained “Horse.”
Mutatis mutandis, the same kind of communication, with removed information about what was the selection
for the Animal concept, will be given to Bob, so that Alice and Bob will be able to deduce the correct
marginal probabilities, pB(A1), pB(A2) and pA(B1), pA(B2), respectively.
Now, the above information that Alice receives from David, corresponds to an articulate conceptual
combination that defines a specific state of the bipartite conceptual entity (we recall that in our Brus-
sel’s operational-realistic approach to cognition the different conceptual combinations are associated with
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different states for the conceptual entity under consideration; see Aerts et al. (2016)). When such state
is represented using a Hilbertian vector-state, it has to incorporate not only the lack of knowledge about
the choice for Acts, but also the fact that Whinnies has greater probability to be chosen (in the human
conceptual realm) than Growls, in association with Horse. Hence, this will correspond to a superposition
state represented by the first vector in (55), and of course one can reason in the same way for the other
outcome A2, and for the outcomes collected by Bob, who will receive from David a communication with
the Animal information that has been erased.
Note that a conceptual combination expressing a situation of lack of knowledge is to be associated
with a genuine new element of reality in the human conceptual realm, considering that it is human minds
that constitute the measurement instruments and that the latter are sensitive to the meaning content
of such combinations. So, the outcome-states associated with Alice’s and Bob’s sub-measurements have
to be described by superposition states, and not by classical mixtures. Indeed, the additional action of
David communicating the obtained outcomes to Alice and Bob, in the way described above, erasing part
of the information, is equivalent to a change of state of the conceptual entity under consideration, able to
produce interference effects, when subjected to additional measurements, so it truly has to be modeled as
a superposition state, in accordance with the quantum projection postulate (Aerts, 2009a).
It is interesting to also note that in the above scheme there is no influence exerted by Alice on Bob,
and vice versa: they both simply receive some incomplete information about the outcomes of the joint
measurement creating correlations, and since the information sent to Alice is consistent with that sent to
Bob, in the sense that the erased part for Alice corresponds to the non-erased part for Bob, and vice versa,
and that Alice (Bob) also receive specific information on the possible outcomes of Bob’s (Alice’s) sub-
measurements, there is no mystery as to why the marginal conditions (25) can be violated, when different
joint measurements are considered, and of course this has no implications as regards the involvement of
superluminal communication processes, even though David communicates simultaneously to Alice and Bob,
sending them information by means of signals traveling, say, at the light speed (assuming that Alice and
Bob would be separated by some large spatial distance).
10 Concluding remarks
Let us conclude our analysis by recapitulating our findings and offering a few additional comments and
contextualization. A central element and crucial insight was the recognition that in its essence the quantum
entanglement phenomenon, both in physical and conceptual systems, is first of all a “name giving” to non-
product structures that appear in a procedure of identification of what are the possible sub-entities forming
a composite system. Such “name giving” procedure will depend on the specific choice of the isomorphism
considered to implement a given bipartite tensor product structure for the space of states, and consequently
also for the linear operators acting on it. A consequence of that, is that entanglement can naturally appear
not only in the states, but also in the observables, i.e., in the measurements that the different observables
represent. It is of course a known fact that the quantum formalism allows for the entanglement resource
to be totally or partially shifted from the state to the observables, so that depending on the considered
factorization a quantum state can appear either entangled or separable (Thirring et al., 2011; Harshman &
Ranade, 2011; Harshman, 2012). Our more specific point is that the interpretative freedom offered by the
possibility of choosing one or multiple isomorphisms, implementing different tensor product factorizations,
becomes crucial when dealing with experimental situations violating the marginal laws. According to our
analysis, it is licit to affirm that in situations where the measurements’ outcome-states can be assumed to
remain entangled, the (non-spatial) entanglement resource should be attributed not only to the states, but
also to the accessible interactions (i.e., to the measurements), operating at the level of the overall bipartite
entity.
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Thinking of entanglement as being present also at the level of the measurements might seem like a
very drastic perspective, compared to the standard situation where it is only attributed to the state of
the bipartite entity, particularly in those experimental situations where there is a clear spatial separation
between the measurement apparatuses working in a coincident way. However, if the measured entity forms
a whole, it is to be expected that also the measurements can become entangled, precisely through the very
wholeness of the measured entity, because their action on the latter would occur simultaneously and not
sequentially.6 In other words, the notions of locality and separability, usually intended as ‘spatial locality’
and ‘spatial separability’, need here be replaced by the more general notions of ‘sub-system locality’ and
‘sub-system separability’. This because among the salient properties of physical and conceptual systems,
there is precisely that of non-spatiality, and therefore ‘separation in space’ is not anymore a sufficient
criterion for characterizing a separation of two sub-systems and corresponding joint measurements.
We have however also emphasized that it is always possible to also adopt each time, for each joint
measurement, a specific tailor-made entanglement identification. Then, all the entanglement can be pushed,
for each joint measurement, into the state only, with the joint measurement being described as usual as
a product measurement. In this way, everything becomes explicitly contextual, in the sense that for each
coincidence experiment a different state has to be used to represent the compound entity, which can only
be justified when the effect of the measurement is that of disentangling the previously entangled entity.
In Sec. 5, we already emphasized that a violation of the marginal laws does not necessarily imply a
violation of the Einsteinian no-signaling principle. It is instructive to recall here the typical reasoning
that makes one believe that this is instead to be expected (Ballentine & Jarrett, 1987). One assumes that
Alice and Bob have their laboratories located at great distance from one another, and that they succeeded
sharing a very large number of identically prepared entangled bipartite systems, and that they are also
able to jointly experiment on all of them in a parallel way, so obtaining an entire statistics of outcomes in
a negligible time. Then, if all these extraordinary things can be done with great efficiency, one can imagine
that Alice and Bob could have arranged things in such a way that the choice of which sub-measurement
to perform, say on the part of Bob, is the expression of a code they use to communicate. And since
Bob’s choice of sub-measurements can be distinguished by Alice in her statistics of outcomes, because
of the violation of marginal selectivity, one might conclude in this way that some kind of supraluminal
communication could arise between them.
Now, there is a loophole in the above reasoning which is usually not taken into consideration. There is
no doubt that Alice has a means to infer the sub-measurement performed by Bob, if the marginal laws are
violated, but what is the total duration of their overall communication? Certainly, one has to include into
that duration also the time required to prepare the shared entangled entities, on which their numerous joint
measurements have to be performed in parallel. These need to propagate from the source towards the two
interlocutors, who we can assume to be equidistant from the latter. So, if d is the distance separating Alice
from Bob, in the best scenario they can collect all these shared entangled states, sent in parallel, in a time
equal to d2c . If we assume that their measurements are then associated with instantaneous collapses, one
would be tempted to conclude that their communication can arise at an effective speed of twice the light
speed. What one is here forgetting, however, is to also include the time needed for this whole process to be
initiated. Indeed, the communication does not start when Alice and Bob perform their joint measurements
on a statistical ensemble of entangled entities, but at the moment when they decide to activate the source
in order to use it to communicate. This means that, assuming that the communication is started by Bob,
he will have to send a signal to activate it, which will require at best an additional time d2c . Hence, the
controlled transfer of information between Alice and Bob cannot happen with effective speed greater than
6It is of course possible to also imagine experimental situations where the sub-measurements would be genuinely sequential,
with mixed orders of execution. In this case, one can show that the violation of the marginal laws could result from the
possible incompatibility of Alice’s and Bob’s experimental procedures, giving rise to order effects (Sassoli de Bianchi, 2019b).
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the speed of light. In other words, if we intend a communication as a process such that the sender of the
message decides when to initiate it, and does so on purpose, then even when the marginal laws are violated
one cannot exhibit a contradiction with special relativity.
In fact, additionally to the theoretical reasoning presented above, there is an even easier way to see the
loophole, which is the following. Consider again the second example we put forward in this article, that of
the elastics violating both the CHSH inequality and the marginal laws. We can easily make an experimental
arrangement such that the events where Alice and Bob gather the outcomes of their joint measurements
are spacelike separated, relativistically speaking. If the spacelike separation would be the criterion which
makes it possible to use the violation of the marginal laws to send signals faster than light, according to
the method sketched above, this should also work with our example of the elastics, which obviously is not
the case, exactly because of the mentioned problem of the extra time needed for a complete execution of
the communication. In other words, if quantum micro-entities in entangled states violating the marginal
laws would lend themselves to signaling, elastic bands would be equally suitable for this purpose, which is
obviously not the case.
One might disagree with the part of the reasoning above saying that a communication between Bob
and Alice can be said to have started only when one of the two has sent a signal to activate the source,
but the fact remains that an effective signaling resulting from correlations of the second kind would be
of a completely different nature than a causal influence of the “spooky action at a distance” kind, which
is usually imagined to happen in situations where entanglement is at play. All sorts of correlated events
happen in our physical (and cognitive) reality, which are spacelike separated, as a result of the fact that
there are common causes at their origin, and nobody would of course dare to say that relativity should
forbid spacelike correlated events based on common causes. Now, our proposed description of quantum
measurements as processes resulting from some ‘hidden-measurement interactions’ (Aerts & Sassoli de
Bianchi, 2014, 2016), is also of the kind where a common cause would be responsible for the actualization
of two correlated outcomes, which can be spacelike separated, with the only (important) difference that the
common cause in question would be present at the (non-spatial) potential level and would be actualized
each time in a different way, at each run of a joint measurement. From that perspective, even when the
marginal laws are violated, there would be no signaling in the strict sense of the notion, i.e., in the sense
of having signals propagating in space with a velocity greater than that of light (see also the discussion in
Aerts (2014); Sassoli de Bianchi (2019b)), so, no abandonment of the relativity principles is necessary.
Having said that, we conclude by coming back to the criticism expressed by Dzhafarov & Kujala
(2013), which we already mentioned in the Introduction, according to which our analysis of the conceptual
model of Sec. 2.3 would not be revealing of the presence of a genuine form of entanglement, because the
data not only violate the CHSH inequality, but also the marginal laws.7 Such criticism is based on their
Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) approach, which they use to derive a modified CHSH inequality where
the usual expression is corrected by subtracting terms that are non-zero if the marginal laws are violated
(Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2016). This means that according to their modified inequality, a violation of the
marginal laws would generally reduce the amount of entanglement (which they simply call ‘contextuality’
in their approach) that a bipartite system is truly manifesting. This goes completely countercurrent with
the view that emerges from our analysis, according to which a violation of the marginal laws, in addition to
a violation of the CHSH inequality, would instead be the signature of a stronger presence of entanglement,
requiring a modeling also at the level of the measurements.8
The reasons for this discrepancy between our interpretation and that of Dzhafarov and Kujala, is that
their definition of contextuality is too restrictive to capture the overall interconnectedness that permeates
7For some previous responses to these criticisms, see also Aerts (2014); Aerts et al. (2018b).
8This is so not only when the marginal laws are disobeyed, but also when they are obeyed but the CHSH inequality is
violated beyond Tsirelson’s bound (Aerts & Sozzo, 2013).
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both the micro-physical and cognitive realms, which give rise to the phenomenon of entanglement and
which in the case of conceptual entities can be generally understood as a ‘connection through meaning’.
Indeed, their way of looking at the experimental situation is based on the same kind of prejudice that led
physicists to describe entanglement as a “spooky action at a distance.” For Dzhafarov and Kujala, the
joint measurements described in Sec. 2.3, always involve two distinct interrogative contexts, one associated
with Alice, who is assumed to “select an animal,” and the other associated with Bob, who is assumed to
“select an act,” and these two processes are meant not to influence one another. This is of course a very
unsatisfactory way of depicting the actual experimental situation, which as we explained is the result of a
unique interrogative context that we described using David’s fictitious character, whose cognitive process,
when selecting an exemplar for The Animal Acts, cannot be decomposed into two separate processes.
Indeed, it is a process operating at the level of the non-decomposable meaning of the entire sentence, in
the same way that two hands pulling an elastic band operate at the level of the entire non-decomposable
unity of the elastic. And of course, this non-decompositionality of the process will generally be able to
produce a violation of the CHSH inequality and of the marginal laws, the latter being obeyed only if some
remarkable symmetries would be present both in the system and measurement processes.
In other words, Dzhafarov and Kujala’s disagreement is an expression of the same prejudice that we
believe is still in force today among some physicists, when they think that a ‘spatial separation’ should also
imply an ‘experimental separation’, thus failing to recognize that our physical reality is mostly non-spatial.
That a same kind of classical prejudice would be in force also among some cognitive scientists is a bit more
surprising, considering that in the conceptual domain, because of the all-pervading meaning connections,
the claim that an overall cognitive process should decompose into separate sub-processes is not a very
natural one, for instance because a conceptual combination cannot be modelled using a joint probability
distribution with its variables corresponding to the interpretation of the individual concepts. Dzhafarov
and Kujala’s objection is based on the observation that the choice of an exemplar for Animal would be
influenced not only by the options that are offered for that choice, but also by the options that are offered
for the choice of an exemplar for Acts. But speaking in terms of mutual influences (as is systematically
done for instance in the general mathematical theory of ‘selective influences’; see Schweickert et al. (2012)),
means that one is already presupposing a possible separation of the two processes, i.e., a splitting of David’s
mind into two separate Alice’s and Bob’s minds, whereas in reality there is only a single-mind cognitive
process or, to put it in a different way, David’s mind cannot be understood as a ‘juxtaposition’ of Alice’s
and Bob’s sub-minds, but as their ‘superposition’, as it also emerged from our discussion of Sec. 9.
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